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Abstract—Collaborative (federated) learning enables multiple
parties to train a global model without sharing their private data,
but through repeated sharing of the parameters of their local
models. Each party updates its local model using the aggregation
of all parties’ parameters, before each round of local training.
Despite its advantages, this approach has many known privacy
and security weaknesses and performance overhead, in addition
to being limited only to models with homogeneous architectures.
Shared parameters leak a significant amount of information
about the local (and supposedly private) datasets. Besides,
federated learning is severely vulnerable to poisoning attacks,
where some participants can adversarially influence the aggregate
parameters. Large models, with high dimensional parameter
vectors, are in particular highly susceptible to privacy and
security attacks: curse of dimensionality in federated learning.
We argue that sharing parameters is the most naive way of
information exchange in collaborative learning, as they open all
the internal state of the model to inference attacks, and maximize
the model’s malleability by stealthy poisoning attacks.
We propose Cronus, a robust collaborative machine learning
framework. The simple yet effective idea behind designing
Cronus is to control, unify, and significantly reduce the dimen-
sions of the exchanged information between parties, through
robust knowledge transfer between their black-box local models.
We evaluate all existing federated learning algorithms against
poisoning attacks, and we show that Cronus is the only secure
method, due to its tight robustness guarantee. Treating local
models as black-box, reduces the information leakage through
models, and enables us using existing privacy-preserving algo-
rithms that mitigate the risk of information leakage through the
model’s output (predictions). Cronus also has a significantly lower
sample complexity, compared to federated learning, which does
not bind its security to the number of participants. It also allows
collaboration between models with heterogeneous architectures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collaborative machine learning has recently emerged as
a promising approach for building machine learning models
using distributed training data held by multiple parties. The
training is distributed, and participants repeatedly exchange
information about their local models, through an aggregation
server. The objective is to enable all the participants to
converge to a global model, while keeping their data private.
This is very attractive to parties who own sensitive data,
and agree on performing a common machine learning task,
yet are unwilling to pool their data together for centralized
training. Various applications can substantially benefit from
collaborative learning. Examples include medical and financial
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applications, intelligent virtual assistants, speech recognition,
keyboard input prediction, and mobile vision [14], [35].
A popular approach for collaborative deep learning, known
as federated learning, assumes homogeneous local models, i.e.,
with the same architecture [47], [35]. Every model shares its
parameters (or gradients) with a parameter server, after each
rounds of training on its local data. The server aggregates the
parameter vectors by computing their element-wise mean, and
shares the aggregate with the participants. Each party updates
its local model with the latest global aggregate, and continues
with the next round of local training.
There are major obstacles hindering the scalable deployment
of secure and truly privacy-preserving federated learning for
sensitive applications. Existing federated learning algorithms
are not robust to adversarial updates [12], [13] and backdoor
attacks [12], [10], and can leak a significant amount of
sensitive information about local datasets [40], [36]. Besides,
federated learning cannot be used for aggregating heteroge-
neous models, for participants that use different models as
they have different memory and computing power.
In this paper, our main focus is on protecting collaborative
machine learning against poisoning attacks. There exist a long
chain of recent poisoning attacks and defenses for federated
learning [37], [55], [57], [13], [53], [34], [40], [12], [10].
All existing defenses focus only on replacing the vulnerable
aggregation in federated learning with a robust mean function,
leaving the rest of the framework intact. But, as it is shown
in the literature, and as we show in this paper, all existing
(aggregation) algorithms in federated learning are susceptible
to some form of poisoning attack, which can significantly
damage the global model.
By sharing the model parameters, federated learning com-
pletely opens the local models to the (potentially malicious)
server and untrusted participants. This is a serious privacy
vulnerability as the model parameters leak all the information
that the model has about its training data [40], [36]. The
problem is significantly worse for large models, with huge
number of parameters. This high dimensionality not only
magnifies the problem, but also makes it harder to design
a defense mechanism with tight (robustness and privacy)
guarantees. We refer to this as the curse of dimensionality
for privacy and security in federated learning.
The theoretical error bound and sample complexity1 of the
existing robust aggregation algorithms [13], [37], [16], [17],
[15], [33] depend on the dimensionality of model parameters.
The high dimensionality of the models makes the error bound
and sample complexity of these robust aggregation algorithms
prohibitively high, which makes these algorithms susceptible
to some form of poisoning attacks. Besides, federated learning
algorithms require overwriting the local models’ parameters by
the global model. This makes them extremely susceptible to
poisoning and backdoor attacks, as the adversary can make
small changes in the high-dimensional models which damage
the model, but are hard to detect.
Thus, sharing model parameters to transfer the knowledge
of local models is a wrong design choice in federated learn-
ing, especially considering that this is not the only way of
exchanging knowledge between models.
Our contributions. In this paper, we design Cronus, a
collaborative learning approach to address the fundamental
shortcomings of federated learning. Instead of sharing pa-
rameters with the server, and updating them by overwriting
them with the aggregated parameters, we extract, aggregate,
and transfer the knowledge of models in a black-box manner.
We use knowledge transfer algorithms, which are used for
various compression and regularization purposes in machine
learning [21], [9], [54], [7], or as part of a low-sensitivity
algorithm to train a model in a centralized setting with
differential privacy [43], [44].
In Cronus, we support heterogeneous model architectures,
as knowledge transfer through distillation allows sharing mod-
els via their predictions. For this purpose, we assume that an
unlabeled public dataset is available. After a few rounds of
local training on their private data, the Cronus parties share
their predictions on the public data.
Local models are fine-tuned using the aggregated predic-
tions (instead of directly overwriting their parameters), which
significantly reduces the potential of harmful updates on local
models. Besides, Cronus reduces the dimensions of the update
vectors to the size of the model’s output, as opposed to the size
of the model’s parameters. This reduces the dimensionality
of the vectors in robustness algorithms, by many orders of
magnitudes. Thus, we are able to provide tight provable
robustness guarantees on the aggregation algorithms, even for
small networks. with a dozen of participants.
The distillation process, using disjoint data to the models’
training set, is used as a regularization technique [9], and can
reduce information leakage about the training data [48]. More
importantly, the black-box nature of our algorithm also allows
for using privacy-preserving mechanisms by the parties that
are tailored to specifically protect the privacy of local training
data in the black-box setting [39], [18].
Using benchmark datasets, we comprehensively compare
the robustness of Cronus with existing federated learning
algorithms. We evaluate them against strongest poisoning
1Sample complexity, in the context of federated learning, is the number of
parties required to achieve the theoretical error bound.
attacks in the literature. We also design new attacks that breaks
a class of aggregation algorithms (based on multiplicative
weights updates [8], [34]). We show that each and every of the
aggregation schemes used in federated learning (and proposed
to make it robust) can be broken using some form of poisoning
attacks. The models’ accuracy under attack is significantly
reduced, sometimes to that of a random guess. However, none
of the poisoning attacks can impact the accuracy of models
learned using Cronus leaning, beyond at most 2% of drop
in prediction accuracy. For the strongest attack on Cronus
learning, the reduction in accuracy for Purchase models is
1.6%, for SVHN model is 1.3%, for MNIST model is 1.5%,
and for CIFAR10 is 2.1%.
Due to sharing knowledge through predictions, Cronus
significantly reduces the risk of active and passive membership
inference attacks. The Cronus learning also allows for local
party models to prevent sensitive information leakage through
their predictions. We train local models with membership
privacy through adversarial regularization [39]. Using this
approach, we show that, for the evaluated datasets, the ac-
curacy of membership inference attacks drops to near random
guessing, with negligible accuracy loss. We empirically show
that the stat-of-the-art differential privacy algorithms for deep
learning [4], [14] do not provide good prediction accuracy, and
are of lower accuracy even compared to stand-alone training.
Finally, we evaluate Cronus with heterogeneous model ar-
chitectures, and show its effectiveness without compromising
the final accuracy of party models.
II. THREAT MODELS
In this work, we investigate two important threats against
federated learning algorithms: (1) poisoning attacks against
the robustness of aggregation schemes used in federated
learning [11], [12], [37], and (2) inference attacks against the
privacy of models’ sensitive training data [40], [36].
A. Poisoning attacks
The aim of the poisoning attacks is to indiscriminately
jeopardize the accuracy of the resulting models of the fed-
erated learning. To achieve this, the adversary controls an ǫ
fraction of the total n parties and sends malicious updates to
the server through the ǫn malicious parties. We assume that
the adversary also has access to some data which is drawn
from the same distribution as that of the local training data of
the (1 − ǫ)n benign parties. Therefore, the adversary has the
upper hand in that it can obtain benign updates, and use them
to craft effective malicious updates using various poisoning
attacks (Section IV). Each (robust) aggregation algorithm has
a breaking point with respect to ǫ, i.e., it cannot provide any
robustness guarantee if ǫ is larger than the breaking point.
We set the fraction of the attackers to be the maximum value
which is less than the breaking point, so the robust aggregation
algorithms can be evaluated against the strongest attack that
they claim they can protect against.
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B. Inference attacks
In federated learning, we consider the information leakage
through each party’s update, and through the aggregated
updates, about the party’s local data. The attacker can run
membership inference attacks on an individual party’s update
or on the aggregate of updates from all parties [40]. The adver-
sary’s objective is to infer if a particular sample belongs to the
private training data of a single party (if target update is of a
single party) or of any party (if target update is the aggregate).
Following the previous works [36], [40], to evaluate the risk to
a party i due to a strong membership inference adversary, we
assume that the adversary has knowledge of 50% of members
of di and the equal number of non-members. The adversary
then trains a binary classifier on various features of the victim
models in order to learn to distinguish between the members
and non-members of di.
III. AGGREGATION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we first describe the setting of federated
learning and, various aggregation algorithms used to combine
the updates of the collaborating parties and their theoretical
robustness guarantees.
A. Federated learning setting
Federated learning [35], [47] enables multiple data holders
to train a global model without sharing their data, and through
sharing of their training gradients/parameters [13], [6], [37],
[55], [57]. For concreteness, below we describe Federated
Average (FedAvg) algorithm [35] and its setting, and use it
in the rest of our work.
In FedAvg, multiple parties collaborate over multiple epochs
to learn a global machine learning model with a classification
performance superior to the models learned individually. Fe-
dAvg assumes that there are n parties with their local training
datasets, Di’s, and a central server which aggregates the party
updates and broadcasts the aggregate to all of the parties.
In the tth epoch of FedAvg, parties train the aggregate θta,
broadcast by the server at the end of tth epoch, on their local
training data, Di. Parties use stochastic gradient descent for
updating, i.e., θti = θ
t
a −∇θL(Di; θta), where L(D; θ) is loss
of θ on data D. Each party then sends the parameters of
the locally updated model, θti , to the server for aggregation.
The central server collects all the θti updates and computes
their aggregate θta = fAGG(θ
t
i∈[n]). Specifically, FedAvg uses
the weighted average as its fAGG, where the weight of the i
th
party is determined based on the size of her local training data,
i.e., wi =
|Di|
|D| ; |D| denotes size of dataset D. The weighted
average is formally given by:
fMean : θ
t+1
a =
n∑
i=1
|Di|∑n
j=1 |Dj|
θti (1)
The server then broadcasts the aggregate θta to all n parties.
This process repeats for T epochs or until sufficient accuracy
is achieved by the aggregated global model. The procedure
Algorithm 1 Federated learning algorithm [35], [47]
1: Initialize global model θ0a
2: for t ∈ [T ] do
3: for i ∈ [n] do ⊲ Party i’s local update
4: θti ← θta −∇θL(Di; θta)
5: Return θti to server
6: end for
7: θt+1a = fAGG(θ
t
i∈[n]) ⊲ Aggregation of updates at server
8: Return θt+1a to all the parties
9: end for
Table I: Theoretical error rates of aggregation algorithms. n is number
of parties, ǫ is breaking point, i.e., malicious parties’ fraction, d (dp) is
updates’ dimensions, and σ2 is the variance of each of the dimensions
(assume each dimension has the same variance). Cronus, unlike other
aggregations, has error rate independent of the dimension of updates.
Breaking Statistical Computational
point error rate cost
Mean [35] 1/n Unbounded O(nd)
Median [33] 1/2 O(σǫ
√
d) O(nd log n)
Krum [13] (n− 2)/2n O(σn√d) O(n2d)
Bulyan [37] (n− 3)/4n O(σ√d) O(n2d)
Cronus 1/2 O(σ
√
ǫ) O(d3p + n)
is described in Algorithm 1. This algorithm is not robust
against poisoning attack and even a single party can destroy the
global model. Multiple robust aggregation schemes have been
proposed in the literature to improve the resilience of federated
learning to poisoning attacks while maintaining the accuracy
of the final model [37], [55], [57], [13]. For instance, median
is a more robust statistic of data compared to mean [25],
[53], [57], and therefore, fMean in FedAvg can be replaced
with weighted median aggregation fMedian, which computes
coordinate-wise weighted median of the updates.
B. Krum
Weighted average aggregation cannot tolerate even a single
malicious party [13], [53]. To solve this problem, Blanchard
et al. [13] proposed Krum aggregation, which is based on
geometric median of vectors [51], [37]. The intuition behind
Krum is as follows: Krum assumes that party updates have
a normal distribution and that the benign updates lie close to
each other in the parameter space. Hence, instead of computing
the average of the updates, Krum selects as aggregate the
update that is closest to its (1 − ǫ)n neighbor updates. The
details of the aggregation are as follows.
Let θ1, ..., θn be the updates received by the server. For
i 6= j, i → j denotes that θj belongs to the (1 − ǫ)n − 2
updates closest to θi. Let s(θi) =
∑
i→j ||θi − θj ||2 be the
score of θi. Then, Krum selects the θk with the lowest score.
The Krum aggregation algorithm is formalized in (2).
fKrum : θ
t+1
a = argmin
θt
i∈[n]
∑
i→j
||θti − θtj ||2 (2)
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C. Bulyan
The breaking point of Krum is ǫ = (n−22n ), i.e., it can
tolerate up to (n−22 ) malicious parties, while maintaining high
utility of the final model [13]. However, El Mhamdi et al.
[37] proposed an attack on Krum assuming an omniscient
adversary who has access to all the benign updates. The
attack exploits the fact that, in a vector space of dimension
d≫ 1, small disagreements on each coordinate translate into a
distance ‖x−y‖p = O( p
√
d). Therefore, the adversary crafts a
malicious update with a single dimension set to a large value,
and the other dimensions set to the average of the benign
updates. Such malicious update pushes the parameter vector to
a sub–optimal parameter space and destroys the global model’s
accuracy.
Essentially, Krum filters outliers based on the entire update
vector, but does not filter coordinate-wise outliers. To address
this, [37] proposes a meta-aggregation rule Bulyan, which
performs vector-wise, e.g. Krum, and coordinate-wise, e.g.
TrimmedMean [57], filtering in two steps. At first, Bulyan
uses some Byzantine resilient aggregation A, e.g., Krum in
Algorithm 2, to filter outliers based on the distances between
the update vectors, and then aggregates these updates using a
variant of TrimmedMean. Algorithm 2 describes the Bulyan
aggregation.
Algorithm 2 Bulyan aggregation: fBulyan [37]
1: Input: A = fKrum, P = (θt1, ..., θtn), n, ǫ
2: S ← ∅
3: while |S| < (1− 2ǫ)n do
4: p← A(P\S)
5: S ← S ∪ {p}
6: end while
7: Output: θt+1a = TrimmedMean(S)
Among the different variants of TrimmedMean [55], [37],
[57], we follow the one used in the original work [37] given
in (3). Here, Uj is defined as the set of indices of the top-
(1− 2ǫ)n values in (θj1, ..., θjn) nearest to their median µj .
TrimmedMean(θ1, ..., θN ) =
{
θja =
1
|Uj |
∑
i∈Uj
θji ∀j ∈ [d]
}
(3)
D. Multiplicative weight update (MWU)
Multiplicative weight update (MWU) technique lies at the
core of many learning algorithms [8], [19], [45], [20], [34].
The general framework of MWU is given in Algorithm 3.
The intuition behind MWU-based aggregations is to reduce
the weights of malicious parties using the distance between
their malicious updates and the aggregated update. This is
based on two assumptions: malicious updates lie farther away
from the mean compared with the benign updates, and the
number of malicious updates is smaller than that of the benign
updates. Therefore,MWU-based aggregation schemes have the
breaking point of ⌊n−12 ⌋ malicious parties.
Algorithm 3 Multiplicative weights update: fMWU
1: Input: P = (θt1, ..., θtn)
2: Initialize parties’ weight vector w0 ← 1 and θ0a ← fAGG(w0,P)
at t = 0
3: repeat
4: w
t+1 ← WeightUpdate (wt, θta,P)
5: θt+1a ← fAGG(wt+1,P)
6: t← t+ 1
7: until Convergence criterion is satisfied
8: Output: final θa
There are different variants of MWU that use different
functions for WeightUpdate and fAGG in Algorithm 3. We
detail two of them next.
1) MWU with mean aggregation: InMWU, if the weighted
mean (Section III-A) is used as the aggregation algorithm,
fAGG in Algorithm 3, it is called MwuAvg. Here, the weight
of the ith party is updated based on the distance between the
weighted average, θta, of all the updates and θi; this is given by
(4). The weights of all the parties are equal at the beginning.
wt+1i = w
t
i exp(−||θta − θi||p) (4)
θt+1a =
∑n
i=1 w
t+1
i θi∑n
i=1 w
t+1
i
(5)
2) MWU with optimization: Li et al. [34] propose a truth
discovery framework CRH, to aggregate the responses in a
crowd-sourcing setting. In each epoch, the framework updates
the weights of parties based on the solution of an optimization
problem. Essentially, the weight update algorithm considers
the distance of parties’ updates from the aggregate of all
the updates in each epoch. The weight update and aggregate
computation are given by (6) and (7), respectively. For further
details of the aggregation, please refer to [34].
wt+1i = −log
(
||θt − θi||p∑n
i=1 ||θt − θi||p
)
(6)
θt+1 =
n∑
i=1
wt+1i θi (7)
IV. ATTACKS ON AGGREGATION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we detail the poisoning and membership
inference attacks used in our work to evaluate the robustness
and privacy in federated learning. The poisoning attacks are of
two types: availability and targeted attacks. The earlier attacks
aim to jeopardize the overall accuracy of the final model/s [11],
[23], [50], while the latter attacks aim to mis-classify only
a specific set of samples of the attacker’s choice at the test
time [10], [12]. We focus on the poisoning availability attacks
and below introduce such attacks from the literature, and also
introduce a new poisoning attack targeting the MwuAvg and
MwuOpt aggregations.
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A. Label flip poisoning (Label flip)
We consider a type of data poisoning attacks [26], [38], [23],
where the adversary flips the labels of her local training data
in a particular fashion to poison it. We call this attack label
flip poisoning attack. The label flipping strategy is performed
consistently across all of the ǫn malicious parties that the
adversary controls, i.e., all the malicious parties flip labels
in the exact same way. Then, the ǫn malicious parties use
this poisoned data to train their local models and then share
corresponding updates with the central server.
B. Naive poisoning (PAF)
Our threat model from Section II considers an omniscient
adversary who knows the distribution of benign updates, i.e.,
the mean and standard deviation of each dimension of benign
updates. The adversary can estimate this distribution as she
possesses data drawn from the distribution same as that of
benign parties. Given this, the adversary crafts the malicious
update θm to be arbitrarily far from the mean of the benign
updates:
θm =
∑n
i=1 θi
(1− ǫ)n + θ
′ (8)
This malicious update, θm, is then shared by each malicious
party with the central server. In (8), θ′ is a vector of size
|θi| with arbitrarily large coordinate values. This attack can
jeopardize the weighted averaging, and interestingly, weighted
median aggregations based federated learning (Section III-A).
C. Little is enough attack (LIE)
Baruch et al. [11] propose an attack called little is enough
(LIE). The attack successfully circumvents state-of-the-art
robust aggregation algorithms, including Bulyan and Krum.
These aggregations are vulnerable to the attack, because they
are tailored to an adversary that crafts a malicious update with
at least one arbitrarily large dimension. However, in practice,
a malicious update, θm, obtained by small perturbations in
a large number of dimensions of a benign update suffice to
affect model’s convergence and also circumvent the defenses.
Therefore, note that, the root cause of the success of the LIE at-
tack is also the high dimensionality of the updates. The attack
is described in Algorithm. 4. El Mhamdi et al. [37] propose
an attack against geometric median based aggregations such
Algorithm 4 Little is enough attack (LIE) [11]
1: Input: n, ǫ, mean and variance vectors of benign updates µ¯, σ¯
2: Number of workers required for majority:
s = ⌊n
2
+ 1⌋ − ǫn
3: Using z-table, set z = max
z
(
φ(z) < n−s
n
)
4: for j ∈ [d] do
5: θjm ← µ¯j + zσ¯j
6: end for
7: Output: malicious update θm
as Krum, but does not work against Bulyan, and therefore is
omitted from the evaluation.
D. Our poisoning attack (OFOM)
In this section, we propose an attack which targets aggre-
gation schemes that perform weighted aggregation of data
by assigning the weights based on the distance of the data
points from an aggregate of the data. These aggregations are
robust to all the above attacks, as we show in our evaluation.
We discussed two such aggregation schemes: MWU with
averaging [8] and MWU with optimization [34] in Section III.
In any given epoch, the aforementioned aggregation schemes
start with equal weights to all parties and update a party’s
weight based on the distance of the party’s update from
weighted average of all party updates. The attack exploits the
fact that, all parties are given equal weights to start with. The
OFOM attack craft two malicious updates: The first update,
θm1 , is arbitrarily far away from the true mean, and is obtained
by adding an arbitrarily large vector θ′ to the mean of benign
updates. The second malicious update, θm2 , is at the empirical
mean of benign updates and θm1 . The malicious updates are
formalized in (9).
θm1 =
∑n
i=1 θi
n
+ θ′, θm2 =
∑n
i=1 θi + θ
m
1
n+ 1
(9)
This way, at the end of the first epoch of the MWU
aggregation, the adversary manages to assign a weight close
to 1 to the parties with update θm2 . In the case of MWUAvg
and MWUOpt, all the benign parties are assigned negligible
weights, which completely jeopardizes the accuracy of aggre-
gation. To be effective, the adversary needs just two malicious
parties who share the two malicious updates.
E. Membership inference attacks
Recent research has shown the susceptibility of the federated
learning to active and passive inference attacks [36], [40]. In
the passive case, the attacker, either the server or some of
the parties, simply observes the updated model parameters
to mount membership inference attacks. In the active case,
however, the attacker tampers with the training of the victim
model/s in order to infer membership of target data in any
of the benign party’s data. Specifically, the attacker shares
malicious updates and forces the victim model/s to share more
information about the members of their training data that are
of the attacker’s interest. This attack, called gradient ascent
attack [40], exploits that the SGD optimization updates model
parameters in the opposite direction of the gradient of the loss
over the private training data. Let x be a record of attacker’s
interest and θa be the current global model. The attacker crafts
the malicious update θm by updating parameters of θa in the
same direction of the gradient of the loss on x, i.e., performs
gradient ascent as: θm = θa+γ
∂Lx
∂θa
. Such θm, when combined
with the benign updates, increases the loss of the resulting
global model, θ′a, on x. If x is in the training data of some
party, SGD on θ′a by this party will sharply reduce the loss of
x. On the other hand, if x is not in any party’s training data,
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the loss of x will remain almost unchanged. Therefore, this
attack increases the gap between the losses of θa on members
and non-members and facilitates membership inference.
V. CRONUS
In the existing federated learning algorithms, described in
Section III-A, the server repeatedly collects the parameters of
the local models, aggregates them by computing their mean,
and sends the aggregate parameter vector back to the parties.
This is the simplest way of sharing knowledge between the
participants, and has the following fundamental drawbacks:
Robustness: As shown in Table I, the upper bound on
the error of aggregation algorithms (in the adversarial setting)
depends on the dimensionality of the model parameters. This
makes the aggregated models to be highly error-prone, for
large models. Thus, they are very susceptible to poisoning
attacks, as described in Section IV.
Privacy: Sharing the model parameters facilitates strong
white-box inference attacks, as it opens up the model to the
adversary [36], [40]. The larger the models are, the more
significant their leakage about their local training data is.
Heterogeneity: Parameter aggregation is restricted to ho-
mogeneous architectures, i.e., all parties need to have the same
model architecture.
Instead of sharing the raw models at each round of training,
the participants would need to share the knowledge that they
have learned from their training data, in a succinct way. This
is the main objective of knowledge transfer [21], [9], [43],
[44], [54], [7], which is a powerful tool to share knowledge
of a model through its predictions.
Knowledge transfer efficiently transfers the represented
function by a model (or an ensemble of models) to a student
model [21]. It makes learning very effective for the student
model by placing equal weight on the relationships learned by
the teachers across all the classes and significantly improves
the convergence of student model (as compared to training
directly on hard-labeled data) [21], [9], [7]. Furthermore,
knowledge transfer is an effective regularization method [21].
What makes this approach, in particular, suitable for robust,
privacy-preserving, and heterogeneous federated learning is
three-fold. First, it significantly reduces the dimensions of
the updates, from the size of the model parameters, to its
output size. This enables using robust aggregation algorithms
with very tight robustness guarantee. Second, it limits the
interactions with each local model to the black-box access
setting. Thus, the negative impact of poisoning attacks onto the
model, and the information leakage from its training data, are
both limited. The knowledge transfer through the predictions
on a dataset, that does not overlap with the model’s training
set, itself reduces the information leakage of a model about
its training data [48]. In addition, the black-box setting allows
us to make use of utility-preserving algorithms to make the
knowledge transfer privacy-preserving, as a party only needs
to mitigate the privacy risk of sharing its predictions [39], [43],
[18]. Third, all the models agree on a particular learning task,
so are homogeneous on their output vectors. Yet, they can be
Table II: Sample complexity, Θ((d/ǫ) log d), of Cronus aggregation,
using [17], for parameters and predictions updates. For parameters,
d is size of model; for predictions, d is the number of classes in the
classification task. The ratio shows that Cronus learning can achieve
the same error guarantee as in federated learning, but with a network
which is 5 orders of magnitude smaller, for benchmark ML tasks.
Dataset Sample complexity ratio of Federated learning over Cronus
SVHN 1.2× 105
MNIST 3.3× 105
Purchase 2.75 × 105
CIFAR10 10.4 × 105
of heterogeneous architectures, or even different families of
machine learning algorithms.
In this paper, we leverage knowledge transfer and pro-
pose the Cronus federated learning algorithm, where the
aggregation algorithm devours the knowledge of local models,
and disgorges their robust aggregation. The parties update
their models using the aggregated knowledge as well as their
local data. Then, each party shares their knowledge through
(privacy-preserving) predictions of their local models on a
public dataset. This repeats in every round of the federated
learning.
A. Cronus Collaborative Learning
In addition to the local private datasets of parties, Cronus
assumes a set of unlabeled public data,Xp. Such public data is
essentially a set of feature vectors that Cronus uses to extract
and exchange the knowledge of local models.
Algorithm 5 describes the Cronus collaborative learning
algorithm. Cronus has two training phases: In the first phase,
called the initialization phase, every party i updates its local
model parameters θi on its local training data Di for T1 times
without any collaboration. In the second phase, called the
collaboration phase, the parties share the knowledge of their
local models via their predictions on the public dataset, Xp.
Specifically, each epoch of this phase includes:
• Each party computes soft labels for Xp, using its local
model parameters θi to get prediction vectors Yi and
shares them with the server.
• The server aggregates the predictions (separately for each
public data), i.e., computes Y¯ = fCronus(Yi, .., Yn), and
sends Y¯ to all parties; fCronus is an aggregation algorithm,
which we describe in Section V-B.
• Each party updates its local model parameters θi using
their private data Di and the soft-labeled public data
(Xp, Y¯ ).
Sharing predictions instead of parameters completely elim-
inates the risk of white-box inference attacks, as no party
releases its model’s parameters. While training on their local
sensitive data, parties can anticipate the privacy risks of infor-
mation leakage through their predictions and TRAIN their mod-
els with, for example, a membership privacy mechanism [39].
They can also make use of prediction privacy mechanisms
before sharing their predictions with the server [18].
It’s important to note that, unlike the existing federated
learning algorithms, based on FedAvg [35], Cronus does
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Algorithm 5 Cronus algorithm. Initialization phase does not involve
collaboration. Di and θi are local dataset and model paramters from
i-th party. Y ti are predictions from i-th party on public dataset Xp
in epoch t and Y ti [k] is the prediction on k-th public data in Dp.
1: Initialization phase
2: Each party i ∈ [n] updates parameters in parallel:
3: for t ∈ [T1] epochs do ⊲ Training without collaboration
4: Update θi ← TRAIN (θi, Di)
5: end for
6: Y 0i = PREDICT(θi;Xp) ⊲ Compute initial predictions on Xp
7: Send Y 0i to the server
8: Collaboration phase
9: Y¯ 0 = fCronus({Y 0i∈[n]}) ⊲ Initial aggregation at the server
10: for t ∈ [T2] epochs do
11: for i ∈ [n] parties do ⊲ Each party updates parameter in
parallel
12: Dp = {Xp, Y¯ t}
13: θi ← TRAIN (θi, Di ∪Dp) ⊲ Update local model
parameter θi
14: Y ti = PREDICT(θi;Xp)
15: Send Y ti to the server
16: end for
17: Y¯ t+1 = fCronus({Y ti∈[n]}) ⊲ Aggregation at the server
18: end for
not force a single global model onto local models. Instead,
each local model is updated separately by improving their
classification accuracy and resilience to inference attacks. This,
can further improve the robustness of local models against
active attacks (such as poisoning and active inference attacks),
as they do not blindly overwrite their local parameters with
the aggregated knowledge.
The size of the updates and the size of the network
determine the error bound for robust mean estimation algo-
rithms. By reducing the dimensionality of the updates, Cronus
significantly reduces the guaranteed error, using any robust
aggregation algorithm. Then, the sample complexity of the
aggregation algorithm determines how many participants are
needed to achieve a tight error bound. Cronus uses the aggre-
gation algorithm proposed by Diakonikolas et al. [17], whose
sample complexity is Θ(d log d), and has the least dependence
on the dimensionality of updates among existing robust mean
estimation algorithms. Table II shows the sample complexities
for training different ML benchmark models with federated
learning versus Cronus, using Diakonikolas’s algorithm. We
note that Cronus significantly reduces sample complexity (by
an order of 105), and therefore, unlike any existing federated
learning, can achieve strong theoretical error guarantees even
with a small number of parties in the network.
The computational complexity of the state-of-the-art robust
aggregation algorithm is O(d3 + n), where d is the dimen-
sionality of the updates [17]. This makes it impractical to use
such optimal algorithms for the high dimensional parameter
updates. However, the complexity cost is negligible on Cronus,
due to the small number of dimensions on its updates.
Algorithm 6 Cronus aggregation: fCronus [Algorithm 3 [17]]
1: Input: S = (Y1, ..., Yn), ǫ, k=0
2: while k < |Xp| do ⊲ Compute prediction for each public data
3: Sk = (Y1[k], ..., Yn[k])
4: while True do: ⊲ Robust mean aggregation algorithm
5: Compute Y¯k,Σk, the mean and covariance matrix of Sk.
6: Find the eigenvector v∗ with highest eigenvalue λ∗ of Σk
7: if λ∗ ≤ 9 then
8: Let Y¯ [k] = Y¯k and k = k+1
9: break
10: else
11: Draw Z from the distribution on [0,1] with probability
density function 2x
12: Let T = Zmax{|v∗ · (Y − Y¯k)| : Y ∈ Sk}.
13: Set Sk = {Y ∈ Sk : |v∗ · (Y − Y¯k)| < T}
14: end if
15: end while
16: Output: Y¯ = {Y¯ [0], Y¯ [1], ..., Y¯ [k]}
17: end while
B. Robust Mean Estimation in Cronus
We use the robust mean estimation algorithm 6 proposed
by Diakonikolas et al. [17] in Cronus. Algorithm 6 achieves
dimension independent error guarantee and nearly optimal
sample complexity as shown in the Theorem 1.
The intuition behind Algorithm 6 (step 4-15) is that when
the empirical mean of the data is corrupted, then along the
corrupted direction, the empirical variance is much larger than
the population variance. The algorithm finds the direction v∗,
which has the largest variance and projects the deviation of all
the inputs from the empirical mean in this direction. Then filter
out a randomized fraction of the data which are farthest from
the mean, Y¯k , along this direction. Repeat the process until
the variance is not large in every direction and then output
the sample mean on the subsets. We apply the robust mean
estimation for each data in the public dataset Xp separately.
Theorem 1. [Theorem A.16 [17]] Let P be a distribution
on Rd with an unknown mean vector µp and an unknown
covariance matrix Σp  σ2I . Let S be an ǫ-corrupted set of
samples from P of size Θ((d/ǫ) log d). Then, there exists an
efficient algorithm that, on input S and ǫ > 0 , with probability
9/10 outputs µˆ with ||µˆ− µP ||2 = O(σ
√
ǫ).
For the theoretical analysis, Algorithm 6 uses randomized
filtering (step 12) and repeats until the stop condition is
satisfied (step 7). The follow-up works from the same authors
[33], [15] suggest a simpler algorithm to obtain a better perfor-
mance in practice: (1) in each iteration, remove a deterministic
fraction of the data instead of a random fraction. (2) repeat
the filter for constant iterations in total. In the evaluation, we
filter out ǫ/2 fraction of the inputs in each iteration (step 12)
and repeat the filter process 2 times (step 7) and to obtain a
good performance.
7
Table III: Experimental setup
Dataset
# of benign Model Private data Public
parties architecture per party data
SVHN [41] 32 CNN 5,000 10,000
MNIST [32] 28 FC 2,000 10,000
Purchase [48] 16 FC 10,000 10,000
CIFAR10 [30] 16 DenseNet 2,500 10,000
Table IV: Comparison of the classification accuracy of Cronus models
(on average) with that of the models trained in stand-alone (on
average), centralize, and FedAvg settings, in the benign setting.
Dataset Stand-alone Centralized FedAvg Cronus
SVHN 87.5 96.4 95.9 91.1
MNIST 92.8 97.9 96.7 95.2
Purchase 76.3 94.3 93.3 89.6
CIFAR10 66.8 90.2 88.4 80.1
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Table III presents the datasets and corresponding model
architectures, number of parties, and size of the data sets that
we use in our experiments. We defer the reader to Appendix A,
for the descriptions of the datasets, and details of the model
architectures, and training hyper-parameters. We use PyTorch
[2] for our evaluations. We evaluate the security of federated
learning algorithms with respect to the following measures.
Robustness. We measure the robustness of an algorithm
as the ratio between the accuracy of the model against the
strongest poisoning attack, over the accuracy of the model in
the benign setting. For finding the strongest attack, we evaluate
an algorithm against all the attacks which are presented in
Section IV.
Membership inference risk. We measure the membership
inference risk as the accuracy of the inference attack, which
is the percentage of data records for which the attack model
correctly predicts their membership [48]. We test the attack
with the same number of members and non-members. Hence,
50% accuracy corresponds to a random guess.
VII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present the performance of the mod-
els in the benign setting, as the baseline. Then, we compare
Cronus with other algorithms, with respect to their robustness,
privacy, heterogeneity, and communication efficiency.
Table IV shows the classification accuracy of the models
trained using Cronus, versus stand-alone, centralized, and
FedAvg federated learning, all in the benign setting. In the
stand-alone setting, each party trains its only on its local
data, without any collaboration. In the centralized learning,
a single model is trained on the union of the participants’
data. FedAvg federated learning is described in Section II.
For stand-alone setting, and also for Cronus, the accuracy of
models for different parties is different. In these two cases, we
report the average classification accuracy of the models.
Table V: The number of malicious parties used for robustness
assessment of different aggregations, based on their breaking points.
The number of benign parties are shown on top of each column.
fAGG
Number of malicious parties
Breaking SVHN MNIST Purchase/CIFAR10
point 32 benign 28 benign 16 benign
Mean 1/n 1 1 1
Median 1/2 31 27 15
MWU 1/2 31 27 15
Krum (n− 2)/2n 29 25 13
Bulyan (n− 3)/4n 9 8 4
Cronus 1/2 31 27 15
A. Robustness
We compare the robustness of federated learning, using
different aggregation algorithms (Section III), against an ad-
versary who mounts the strong poisoning attacks (described in
Section IV). To assess the worst case robustness, we evaluate
algorithms against the largest fraction of malicious parties
which is smaller than the breaking point. The number of
benign and malicious parties are given in Table V.
The robustness assessment results are shown in Table VI.
Each column corresponds to one aggregation algorithm, and
theWorst accuracy row shows the accuracy of the final models
when the attack in the Strongest attack row is mounted.
Figure 1 shows the convergence of Cronus and federated
learning. We show the convergence plots of the algorithms in
the benign setting, as a baseline for comparison, in Figure 4 in
Appendix B. The federated learning algorithm works well in
the absence of malicious parties, however, all of the existing
aggregation schemes in federated learning are significantly
vulnerable to at least one poisoning attack.
The weighted average aggregation (Section III-A), i.e.,
FedAvg [35], is susceptible to all of the attacks: The accuracy
of FedAvg reduces close to random guess accuracy for all
the datasets. Median aggregation is susceptible to PAF attack
because the attack shifts the final aggregate along all the
dimensions by a small amount to remain undetected, yet it
can considerably damage the utility of the aggregated model.
Although Bulyan and Krum are robust aggregations, they
are susceptible to the LIE attack. As explained in Section
IV-C, LIE attack exploits the sensitivity of the parameters of
neural networks to small perturbations. The attack completely
jeopardizes the accuracy of Krum aggregation, because the
attack successfully forces Krum aggregation to select the
malicious update as the aggregate in most of the epochs. Note
that, the attack is not effective against MNIST classification
task due to its simplicity, which allows the corresponding
models to withstand the small perturbations. MwuAvg and
MwuOpt withstand all the attacks, but are susceptible to our
OFOM attack, which we propose in Section IV-D. For all
the datasets, the OFOM attack reduces the accuracy of the
aggregations close to the random guess accuracy.
On the other hand, the robustness of Cronus remains
almost 1.0 as the classification accuracy of its models
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Table VI: Robustness of the federated learning using different aggregation algorithms versus Cronus. Robustness is measured as the ratio of
the accuracy of the final models against the strongest attack (Section IV) over the models’ accuracy in the benign setting. The number of
benign and adversarial parties are provided in Table V. The best accuracy for each setting (row) is highlighted.
Dataset
Federated learning with various aggregation algorithms
Cronus
Mean Median MwuAvg MwuOpt Bulyan Krum
SVHN
Accuracy (Benign) 95.9 94.8 93.9 94.4 94.5 89.6 91.1
Worst accuracy (Adversarial) 0.9 14.5 0.9 0.7 15.5 16.2 89.8
Strongest attack (OFOM) (LIE) (OFOM) (OFOM) (LIE) (LIE) (Label flip)
Robustness 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.18 0.99
MNIST
Accuracy (Benign) 96.7 96.5 97.2 97.4 96.9 93.3 95.2
Worst accuracy (Adversarial) 9.6 91.5 25.3 12.7 94.1 89.9 93.7
Strongest attack (PAF) (PAF) (OFOM) (PAF) (LIE) (Label flip) (Label flip)
Robustness 0.09 0.95 0.26 0.13 0.97 0.96 0.99
Purchase
Accuracy (Benign) 93.3 93.0 93.6 92.5 92.8 72.1 89.6
Worst accuracy (Adversarial) 1.1 12.5 1.8 1.1 81.8 49.6 88.0
Strongest attack (PAF) (PAF) (OFOM) (OFOM) (LIE) (LIE) (Label flip)
Robustness 0.01 0.75 0.02 0.01 0.87 0.69 0.98
CIFAR10
Accuracy (Benign) 88.4 89.1 86.2 87.6 89.0 84.5 80.1
Worst accuracy (Adversarial) 11.3 15.1 14.2 12.8 75.6 18.0 78.0
Strongest attack (PAF) (PAF) (OFOM) (OFOM) (LIE) (LIE) (LIE)
Robustness 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.85 0.21 0.97
remains unaffected by any of the tested poisoning attacks.
For the strongest attack on Cronus, the maximum reduction
in accuracy is 0.4% for Purchase, 1.3% for SVHN, 1.5% for
MNIST, and 4.8% for CIFAR10 models. The reason for the
high resilience of Cronus to the poisoning attacks is three-
fold: First, as detailed in Section V-A, reduced dimensionality
of updates reduces the aggregate error and the sample com-
plexities required to achieve the error. Second, in Cronus, the
models are not overwritten by aggregate models. We instead
take advantage of knowledge transfer algorithms [21]. The pa-
rameters of a model are sensitive to small perturbations which
can prevent the model from converging [11]. Therefore, in
the existing federated algorithms, the success of the poisoning
attacks stems from the fact that a little noise introduced via
the malicious parameter updates suffices to both prevent the
model from convergence and to bypass the filtering of robust
aggregation algorithms. Third, benign models have a stronger
agreement on their predictions than on their parameter values.
Thus, in Cronus, it is much easier to detect (or cancel the
effect of) the poisoning vectors.
B. Privacy
We evaluate the risk of membership inference attacks on
the participants’ private training data during collaboration,
and the effect of privacy preserving mechanisms [4], [39]. As
described in the threat model in Section II-B, we assume the
central server and other participants to run passive and active
membership inference attacks [40] on individual party updates
and their aggregates. We use Purchase, SVHN, and CIFAR10
datasets for our evaluation when 4 parties collaborate.
1) Passive membership inference attacks: In the case of
passive membership inference attacks, the server isolates the
parties and mounts the attack separately on each of the
collected updates, i.e., in case of FedAvg, attack is mounted
on the parameter updates of each party and in case of Cronus,
attack is mounted on the model obtained by training on the
predictions shared by each party. We also evaluate the privacy
risk when the attack is mounted on the aggregate of these
updates.
The results are shown in Table VII. The updates in FedAvg
are highly susceptible to membership inference unlike
the updates in Cronus. For the Purchase dataset, attack
accuracy against the individual and aggregated updates in
FedAvg is 78.1% and 80.1%, respectively, whereas in Cronus
they are 51.7% and 51.9%. Unlike the prediction updates in
Cronus, the high dimensional parameter updates in FedAvg
encode a significantly higher amount of information about
the party’s local data. Furthermore, knowledge transfer acts
as a strong regularization method and mitigates the risk of
membership inference attacks [21], [49]. It’s important to note
that knowledge transfer through predictions, on a dataset other
than the training data, makes the behavior of the student
model more indistinguishable on its training versus unseen
data. This happens as the distillation process does not carry
the exceptionally distinguishable characteristics of the model
on its training data, and results in smooth decision boundaries
of the student model around the teacher’s training data. We
observe similar results for SVHN and CIFAR10 datasets.
We also evaluate Cronus and FedAvg, when models use
adversarial regularization during local training to improve
membership privacy. We note that, adversarial regularization
improves membership privacy of both FedAvg and Cronus,
but the increase is smaller for Cronus due to its inherent
resilience to membership inference. For Purchase dataset with
FedAvg, the risk to individual and aggregated updates reduces
by 9.9% and 12.7%, respectively, while for Purchase with
9
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
20
40
60
80
Epochs
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ac
cu
ra
cy
Purchase, Strongest attack
0 20 40 60 80 100
20
40
60
80
100
Epochs
MNIST, Strongest attack
0 50 100 150
0
20
40
60
80
Epochs
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ac
cu
ra
cy
CIFAR10, Strongest attack
0 20 40 60 80 100
20
40
60
80
100
Epochs
Cronus
Mean
Median
MwuAvg
MwuOpt
Bulyan
Krum
SVHN, Strongest attack
Figure 1: Convergence of Cronus and existing federated learning algorithms in adversarial setting. Accuracy of Cronus in adversarial setting
is almost the same as in benign setting (shown in Figure 4) due to its high robustness. Except for CIFAR10, for which only collaboration
phase is shown, both the Cronus training phases are shown in figure and the collaboration phase starts at epoch 50.
Cronus, the risk to individual and aggregated updates is
already very small, and it further reduces by 0.6% and 1.1%,
respectively. Similarly for CIFAR10, privacy improvement in
FedAvg is significantly more than in Cronus. However, the
privacy improvement for SVHN is very small even in case
of FedAvg, due to large gaps in train and test accuracies at
stronger adversarial regularization.
2) Active membership inference attacks: In each epoch, the
server manipulates the aggregate update that it broadcasts to
the parties by performing gradient ascent on the aggregated
update for a set of target data [40]. In FedAvg, gradient ascent
is performed directly on the aggregated parameters. In Cronus,
for running such attack, the server needs to train a model on
the aggregated predictions while performing gradient ascent
on the target data, and then, shares predictions of this model
with the parties; we ensure that such model has accuracy close
to the accuracy of party models in given epoch.
Table VII shows the results. The active attacks signifi-
cantly increase the privacy risk of the target data in case
of FedAvg: for Purchase dataset, the risk due to individual
update increases by 7.8% (77.1% to 84.9%), while due to
aggregated update increases by 8% (74.7% to 82.7%). But,
in case of Cronus, the active attacks are ineffective and
the increase in risk is negligible: 0.3% for individual update
while 1.1% for aggregated update. In Figure 2, we show the
effect of gradient ascent on the difference in gradient-norms
of target and non-target data for aggregated model for the
Purchase dataset. This directly correlates with the success of
membership inference [40]. We observe that, for FedAvg on
SVHN dataset, the active attacks increase the risk to individual
and aggregate updates by 2.5% and 4.4%, respectively, but, the
increased risk negligible for Cronus.
C. Differential privacy
We compare the performance of Cronus and the con-
ventional federated learning with user-level [14] or record-
level [4] differential privacy. For both of these comparisons,
we use SVHN dataset with 32 benign parties and the model
architecture as described in Table III, and use the moments
accountant method (and the code) [4], [3] to bound the total
privacy risk. Note that we train the whole model using differen-
tial privacy, as opposed to only training the last layer [4]. Our
results shows the significant accuracy cost of some existing
DP algorithms for federated learning, and calls for designing
DP algorithms with high utility and tight privacy loss.
1) User-level DP [14]: The user-level DP (UDP-FedAvg)
algorithm proposed by McMahan et al. [14] cannot lead to
training good accuracy models, when the number of parties
in each epoch is small. Even for large privacy budgets, i.e.,
ǫ = 100, the parties do not benefit from collaboration, and
with the user-level DP, the global model in FedAvg achieves
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Table VII: Accuracy of passive and active membership inference attacks with central server as adversary. We also evaluate effect of adversarial
regularization (with parameter λ) used to preserve membership privacy. We use 4 parties and data per party as in Table III.
Dataset
Federated Attack on party update Attack on aggregated update
learning Passive Active Passive Active
algorithm attack acc. attack acc. attack acc. attack acc.
Purchase FedAvg 77.1 84.9 74.7 82.7
(without privacy) Cronus 54.6 54.9 53.6 54.7
Purchase FedAvg 70.8 77.3 69.9 77.0
(with membership privacy, λ = 3) Cronus 54.1 51.5 53.7 54.6
SVHN FedAvg 64.8 67.3 59.9 64.3
(without privacy) Cronus 55.6 53.1 56.5 55.7
SVHN FedAvg 64.9 67.0 60.0 64.2
(with membership privacy, λ = 0.5) Cronus 54.1 56.9 55.6 55.0
CIFAR10 FedAvg 79.9 80.5 76.8 77.1
(without privacy) Cronus 57.0 57.8 55.5 56.7
CVIFAR10 FedAvg 59.9 64.1 59.6 62.2
(with membership privacy, λ = 1) Cronus 52.9 54.4 52.6 57.0
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Figure 2: Difference in the gradient-norms, ∇L(D), of the last layer of aggregated model on the target and non-target data (Purchase100
data). In the context of active membership inference attacks, D, Dt, D¯, and D¯t denote non-target members, target members, non-target
non-members, and target non-members, respectively.
close to random-guess accuracy. We observed similar results
for running user-level DP on Cronus with small number
of participants. This result is expected as the sensitivity of
the element-wise mean aggregation algorithm is inversely
proportional to the number of parties, and a very large number
of parties is required to reduce the noise, e.g., [14] uses 5000
parties in each epoch.
2) Record-level DP [4]: We empirically show that the
conventional parameter aggregation in FedAvg is not suitable
to provide the record-level DP, and is also susceptible to
poisoning attacks.
The results are shown in Table VIII for SVHN dataset. The
accuracy of the models for federated learning or Cronus, with
DP-SGD, cannot reach the accuracy of stand-alone training,
which makes the collaboration useless. The results of the
strongest poisoning attacks show that DP-SGD FedAvg has
no robustness against the attacks.
D. Cronus with heterogeneous model architectures
Due to the use of predictions based updates, Cronus allows
parties with heterogeneous model architectures to participate
in collaboration. Below, we compare different aspects of
the homogeneous and heterogeneous collaborations. We use
Purchase data and 5 fully connected models, which we call
Table VIII: Accuracy and robustness of models for record level DP
[4] with ǫ = 15.4 on the SVHN dataset. The baseline stand-alone
accuracy is 87%.
# of Accuracy (Benign) Worst accuracy Robustness
parties FedAvg Cronus FedAvg Cronus FedAvg Cronus
32 65.7 85.8 4.5 83.1 0.07 0.97
16 74.3 84.8 8.1 84.0 0.11 0.99
8 77.9 84.2 0.9 82.2 0.01 0.98
4 81.6 81.5 1.7 81.2 0.02 0.98
A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5, with hidden layer sizes {}, {1024},
{512, 256}, {1024, 256}, and {1024, 512, 256} respectively.
Note that, A1 models, called bad models, have lower capacity
and accuracy than A2-5 models, which we call good models.
We denote by Pj:k the model architectures of parties ∈ [j, k].
We denote the entire collaboration in curly brackets, e.g., we
denote the collaboration of 3 sets of 4 models, i.e. 12 models in
total, each with either of A3, A3, or A4 models by {P1:4 = A2,
P5:8 = A3, P9:12 = A4}. In tables, accuracy of an architecture
is the average accuracy of all the models with that architecture,
e.g., in Table X accuracy of A2 is average of accuracies of all
models with A2 architecture in the two collaborations.
First, we show that the heterogeneous collaboration between
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models of equivalent capacities does not reduce the accuracy
of party models compared to its homogeneous counterparts.
We consider four homogeneous collaborations each of 16
parties such that {P1:16 = A2}, {P1:16 = A3}, {P1:16 =
A4}, and {P1:16 = A5}, and compare it with a heterogeneous
collaboration: {P1:4 = A2, P5:8 = A3, P9:12 = A4, P13:16 =
A5}. The results are shown in Table IX.
Next, we show that the presence of a few bad models
does not affect the accuracy of the good models in the
heterogeneous collaboration, while significantly benefits
the bad models. Specifically, we show that accuracy of the
collaboration of 12 good models, i.e., {P1:4 = A2, P5:8 = A3,
P9:12 = A4} remains unaffected even if 4 bad models are
added to it, i.e., P13:16 = A2, as shown in Table X.
Finally, we show that heterogeneity allows for more
knowledge sharing via collaboration and always improves
the utility of collaborations. We consider 4 homogeneous
collaborations: {P1:4 = A1}, {P1:4 = A2}, {P1:4 = A3},
and {P1:4 = A4} and compare them with a heterogeneous
collaboration that includes all these 16 parties, i.e., {P1:4 =
A1, P5:8 = A2, P9:12 = A3, P13:16 = A4}. Table XI shows
that including more participants clearly benefits all types of
models, although the bad models benefit more than the good
ones. For instance, A1 models improve by 8% from 70.1% to
78.1% due to heterogeneous collaboration, while A2, A3, and
A4 models improve by 3.2%, 2.2%, and 1.4%, respectively.
Table IX: Comparison between heterogeneous and homogeneous
collaborations in Cronus.
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
P1:16 → A2 A3 A4 A5
{P1:4 = A2, P5:8 = A3
P9:12 = A4, P13:16 = A5}
89.6 89.3 88.4 88.6 89.3
Table X: Effect of the presence of low accuracy bad models on the
performance of higher accuracy good models. n is the number of
collaborating parties.
Models
Heterogeneous Heterogeneous
{P1:4 = A2, P5:8 = A3, {P1:4 = A2, P5:8 = A3,
P9:12 = A4} P9:12 = A4, P13:16 = A1}
A1 - 78.1
A2 88.5 88.7
A3 88.6 88.1
A4 88.7 88.1
Table XI: More participation due to heterogeneity always improves
the overall utility of the collaboration.
Models
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
4 small collaborations {P1:4 = A2, P5:8 = A3,
P1:4 = A1/A2/A3/A4 P9:12 = A4, P13:16 = A1}
A1 70.1 78.1
A2 85.5 88.7
A3 85.9 88.1
A4 86.7 88.1
E. Communication overhead of Cronus
Cronus significantly reduces the communication due to shar-
ing of predictions instead of parameters of party models. Now,
50 60 70 80 90 100
80
85
90
Epochs
C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
ac
cu
ra
cy
2k 4k 6k 8k 10k
Figure 3: Communication reduction by randomly subsampling from
the 10k public data in each epoch of Cronus collaboration phase. The
final Cronus accuracy is not affected even when just 2k samples are
used in each Cronus epoch.
we demonstrate that using random subset of public data in each
epoch further reduces communication without compromising
the accuracy of Cronus. In Figure 3, we show the Cronus
training progress in its collaboration phase when public data
of sizes 2k, 4k, 6k, 8k, 10k is sampled randomly in each
epoch; the corresponding accuracies are 88.4, 89.4, 88.7, 89.3,
89.6, respectively. Knowledge transfer improves convergence
of student models [7], and therefore, sub-sampling does not
reduce the convergence rate of Cronus. Therefore, Cronus does
not only reduce the per-epoch communication, but also reduces
the overall communication.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Federated learning aims at training machine learning models
via collaboration, without sharing data among the partici-
pants [47]. However, existing federated learning algorithms
are susceptible to various poisoning attacks which deters data
holders from trusting the algorithm [12], [10], [36]. Bag-
dasaryan et al. [10] demonstrate a targeted poisoning attack
against FedAvg [35] with just one malicious party. Bhagoji et
al. [12] also propose a targeted attack with a single malicious
party to work against two robust aggregation schemes, Krum
[13] and coordinate-wise median [57].
To address the poisoning attacks, many robust aggregation
schemes are proposed in the literature ([37], [13], [57]).
Yin et al. [57] analyze median and trimmed-mean aggrega-
tion rules with provable robustness guarantees. Median and
geometric-median based robust aggregation rules are also ex-
tensively explored [55], [51], [5]. Blanchard et al. [13] propose
Krum aggregation, a computationally tractable modification of
geometric-median, which selects the update that is closest to
its neighbors as the aggregate in a given epoch. El Mhamdi
et al. [37] propose Bulyan, a two-step meta-aggregation al-
gorithm based on the Krum and trimmed median, which
filters malicious updates followed by computing the trimmed
median of the remaining updates. In spite of their robustness
guarantees, these algorithms are shown to be susceptible to
targeted or generic poisoning attacks against deep learning
models [11], [12].
There is a long line of research that considers the problem of
robust mean estimation of a corrupted set of data samples [16],
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[17], [15], [33], and proposes algorithm to tighten the error
bounds and reduce its dependence on the data dimensionality.
The error rate of most of these aggregation algorithms de-
pends on the dimensionality of their inputs [31], [17], [16].
Therefore, the high dimensional updates in federated deep
learning setting significantly reduces the effectiveness of these
algorithms (as their error bounds in presence of poisoning
large vectors are lose). In summary, the high dimensional
updates hinder the use of sophisticated robust algorithms and
also enable strong poisoning attacks. Our Cronus algorithm,
inspired by the knowledge transfer algorithms [9], [21], ad-
dresses these concerns by sharing the knowledge of the local
party models via their predictions on a non-sensitive public
data. This novel knowledge sharing federated learning scheme
significantly reduces the dimensions of updates, and therefore,
reduces the aggregation error.
Although federated learning prevents its participants from
sharing their private data, recent works [40], [42], [36]
demonstrate passive and active inference attacks against this
setting, and successfully infer sensitive information about the
parties’ private data. Such inference attacks can be defended
by using differentially private (DP) learning [4], [14], [18].
By trusting the aggregator, McMahan et al. [14] consider a
federated setting where the server collects clipped gradient
updates from the parties and then adds a calibrated noise
using bounded sensitivity estimators; however, this algorithm
can achieve acceptable accuracy only with a large number of
participants. Besides, it does not protect data privacy against
the aggregator. Treux et al. [52] propose a hybrid approach for
privacy-preserving federated learning that leverages DP and
secure multi-party computation among collaborators. These
works, although provably privacy-preserving, are not robust to
poisoning attacks and produce models with undesirably poor
privacy-utility tradeoffs [27].
Knowledge of ensemble of teacher models has been used to
train a student model in a few previous works [29], [43], [44],
[7], [28]. Papernot et al. [43] propose PATE, a centralized
learning approach that uses ensemble of teachers to label
a subset of unlabeled non-sensitive public data, and then,
trains a student in a semi-supervised fashion with differential
privacy [46]. PATE’s setting is fundamentally different from
that of Cronus in that all the teacher models and the noise
generation mechanisms in PATE are performed by a trusted
entity who owns all the data. Co-distillation approach is a
method to use distillation on private training data with other
parties [7], [28], however, without defending against data
poisoning and inference attacks [48], [56], [22].
IX. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed Cronus learning algorithm as a vari-
ant of federated learning to mitigate the three fundamental
limitations of federated learning: models are susceptible to
data/parameter poisoning attacks, and inference attacks against
local training data, and cannot operate on models with hetero-
geneous architectures. We have used the predictions of the
local models, instead of their parameters, to exchange the
knowledge between the local private models. This enables
heterogeneous federated learning. It also significantly reduces
the dimensionality of inputs of aggregation algorithms, which
results in tight robustness guarantees even for networks with
a small number of participants. Distilling the models’ knowl-
edge, through their prediction vectors, completely eliminates
the possibility of white-box inference attacks, reduces the
overall leakage about local datasets, and enables using utility-
preserving mechanisms for prediction privacy.
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APPENDIX
A. Details datasets and model architectures
We use four datasets in our evaluation, whose details follow.
SVHN. SVHN [41] dataset contains Google’s street view
images of house numbers. The images are 32x32, with 3
floating point numbers containing the RGB color information
of each pixel. We use the extended SVHN dataset with 630,420
samples to train 32 party models each with 5,000 training
samples; the public data size is 10,000. We use validation and
test data of sizes 2,500 each. The reference data required for
adversarial regularization is of the same size as that of training
data for the cases of all the datasets.
MNIST. MNIST [32] dataset contains 28x28 images of
handwritten digits and is composed of 60,000 training samples
and 10,000 test samples. The dataset contains 10 classes each
with 60,000 training and 1,000 test samples. We use validation
and test data of sizes 1,000 each. We use 28 parties each with
2,000 training and reference samples, and public data size is
10,000.
Purchase. Purchase [1] dataset contains the shopping records
of several thousand online customers, extracted during Kag-
gle’s Acquire Valued Shopper challenge [1]. The dataset
contains 197,324 data records with feature vectors of 600
dimensions and corresponding class label from one of total 100
classes. We use validation and test data of sizes 2,500 each.
We use 16 parties each with 10,000 training and reference
data, and public data size is 10,000.
CIFAR10. CIFAR10 [30] has 60,000 color (RGB) images
(50,000 for training and 10,000 for testing), each of 32 × 32
pixels. The images are clustered into 10 classes based on the
objects in the images and each class has 5,000 training and
1,000 test images. We use validation and test data of sizes
2,500 each. We use 16 parties each with 2,500 training data,
and public data size is 10,000.
Model architectures. For SVHN, we use a neural network
with three convolution layers and one fully connected layer,
and Relu activations. For the MNIST dataset, we use a fully
connected neural network with layer sizes {784, 256, 64,
10} and Relu activations. For the Purchase dataset, we use
fully connected neural networks with layer sizes {600, 1024,
100} and Tanh activations. For CIFAR10 dataset, we use
DenseNet architecture [24] with 100 layers and growth rate of
12. For the heterogeneity experiments with Purchase dataset,
we use 5 fully connected networks with hidden layer sizes
[{},{1024},{512, 256},{1024, 256}, {1024, 512, 256}]; here
{} implies that the corresponding model has no hidden layers.
Training hyper-parameters. The initialization and collabo-
ration phases of SVHN, MNIST, and Purchase trained models
are of 50 epochs each. In both the phases, we train party
models on their local training data using Adam optimizer at
0.0005 learning rate. Additionally, in collaboration phase, i.e.,
for epochs 50-100, we train party models on public data,
(Xp, Y¯ ), using SGD optimizer at a learning rate of 0.001.
For CIFAR10, we train models for 200 epochs using SGD
optimizer with 0.1 learning rate, 0.9 momentum, and 10−4
weight decay in both the phases. Additionally, in collaboration
phase, we train the models on public data using SGD optimizer
at 0.01 learning rate, 0.99 momentum, and 10−6 weight decay.
For experiments of membership privacy assessment, we use
state-of-the-art whitebox inference model proposed in [40],
and use the gradients and outputs of its last layer, in addition
to the blackbox access features including prediction of input
and its cross-entropy loss. We train the inference model using
Adam optimizer at a learning rate of 0.0001 for 100 epochs.
B. Additional Details of the Experiment
In this section, we provide the experimental details omitted
in Section VII.
Complete robustness assessment. In Table VI of Section
VII-A, for each dataset and each aggregation algorithm, we
showed the accuracy of the attack that is strongest among
all the attacks discussed in Section IV. We compute empiri-
cal robustness of aggregation algorithms using this strongest
attack as described in Section VI. Here, in Table XII, we
give the complete evaluation of all the attacks on all of
the aggregation algorithms and datasets we consider in this
work. The ‘Accuracy (Benign)’ row of each dataset shows
the results in the absence of adversary. The worst accuracy
for a combination of aggregation algorithm and dataset is
highlighted in the corresponding column; the corresponding
strongest attack can be found from the label of the row of the
highlighted cell. Observe that, label flip attack seems to have
lower effect on mean aggregation than the other aggregations;
this is because, unlike other aggregations, in case of mean,
there is only single malicious client. Note that, MWUAvg
and MWUOpt aggregations are robust against all the existing
attacks in the literature, but are completely ineffective against
the attack we introduced in Section IV-D. Also, note that,
Bulyan aggregation is empirically the most robust aggregation
after Cronus, but it allows only 25 - 33% malicious clients
compared to other aggregation algorithms such as Krum, in
other words, Bulyan has a very low breaking point. The
numbers of malicious parties used in each of our experiments
are given in Table V.
Convergence plots for benign setting. In Figure 1 of Section
VII, we show the convergence plots of various aggregation
algorithms in federated learning in the adversarial setting.
Figure 4 shows the similar convergence plots for the benign
setting. Cronus incurs only a slight reduction in accuracy at a
significantly higher gain in robustness and privacy as shown
in Sections VII-A and VII-B.
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Table XII: Evaluation of the conventional federated learning with various aggregation schemes with Cronus learning using the strong poisoning
attacks described in Section IV. Robustness in Table VI is measured as the ratio of the accuracy of the final model/s when the strongest
attack is mounted and the accuracy in the benign setting; the strongest attack is determined empirically as the one that maximally reduces
the accuracy of the corresponding federated learning aggregation.
Dataset
Federated learning with various aggregation algorithms
Cronus
Mean Median MwuAvg MwuOpt Bulyan Krum
SVHN
Accuracy (Benign) 95.9 94.8 93.9 94.4 94.5 89.6 91.1
Label flip 92.9 90.1 91.2 89.3 93.9 88.6 89.8
LIE 14.8 14.5 91.6 92.0 15.5 16.2 91.5
OFOM 0.9 94.5 0.9 0.7 94.4 89.0 91.0
PAF 12.8 16.4 95.1 93.1 93.4 87.5 91.1
MNIST
Accuracy (Benign) 96.7 96.5 97.2 97.4 96.9 93.3 95.2
Label flip 96.3 94.4 94.7 93.6 96.8 89.9 95.0
LIE 95.1 93.1 95.6 96.7 94.1 94.3 95.9
OFOM 22.1 97.3 25.3 36.0 97.1 94.4 96.1
PAF 9.6 91.5 96.9 12.7 97.1 94.0 96.2
Purchase
Accuracy (Benign) 93.3 93.0 93.6 92.5 92.8 72.1 89.6
Label flip 88.9 89.9 63.4 67.6 91.7 74.8 88.0
LIE 2.5 69.3 92.2 85.6 81.8 49.6 89.2
OFOM 1.4 92.8 1.8 1.1 92.6 74.5 89.4
PAF 1.1 12.5 93.0 88.0 91.0 76.6 89.4
CIFAR10
Accuracy (Benign) 88.4 89.1 86.2 87.6 89.0 84.5 80.1
Label flip – – – – – – 79.8
LIE 18.9 61.2 86.0 84.3 75.6 18.0 78.0
OFOM 12.9 89.5 14.2 12.8 89.1 85.0 78.5
PAF 11.3 15.1 86.4 85.0 89.0 839 79.0
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Figure 4: Convergence of Cronus and existing federated learning algorithms in benign setting. Cronus incurs only a slight degragation in
accuracy compared to existing algorithms, while improves significantly over stand-alone training.
16
